The feet against the King
If we think about monarchy for a while, we can realize that it is actually a strange thing. One person can control land, taxes, soldiers, and even decide disputes between people they might not know. How did we begin to accept this kind of power as normal? We can at least tell something. Some genius did not suddenly invent it. It had to be built, piece by piece, over a very long time.
We cannot say that early human communities had no hierarchy. An elder, a skilled hunter, or someone might have more influence. But making that influence legitimate was difficult. If a leader went too far, people could refuse to listen or simply leave for another group. This ability to leave was a kind of leverage, a bargaining power. There was no "constitutions" yet, but people could still say "no" with their feet.
Things began to change as people settled. Once you had cleared a field, construct an irrigation channel, built a house, and buried your ancestors in that land, “I do not like this, so I will leave” was no longer so easy as before. Grain could be stored in one place. Land could be "owned" and inherited. None of these things automatically produced a king. But the cost of leaving became greater. Rule of the feet is fading. And when one side has fewer alternatives, bargaining power between the ruled and those who can rule them also changes. We traded our bargaining power with surplus values.
Even that was not enough. A granary does not automatically create a kingdom. Someone still has to remember who owes how much, who has already paid, and who uses which land. Here, records and offices become almost as interesting as weapons. A king no longer has to know every farmer yet the register knows the names. A person may die, but their debt, tax obligation or ownership can continue living on records.
Power begins to move outside the body of a particular person. When a charismatic leader dies, their authority may collapse with them. An institution is different. The king can die and the tax collector can still arrive the next day. Military can obey the next king. A son can inherit land he never acquired himself. Records, offices, law and inheritance allow power to live longer than the people who constructed it.
But we should not turn this into a neat domino story of agriculture → city → king. Certain societies kept authority dispersed through councils, rotating leadership and local arrangements. People also resisted. They fled taxation, abandoned cities, or moved into mountains and forests beyond the easy reach of central rulers.
Weapons alone also cannot keep rule legitimate. If a ruler has to hold a sword to every household every time to collect taxes, the system is not very capable yet. Rule becomes more stable when people stop asking why there is a king, why taxes must be paid, or why an order should be obeyed. Law, custom, religion, symbols and ceremonies help turn power into habit. The king becomes normal almost like the weather. The philosophers way later looked back and justified the "social contract" of the governance.
This is why looking only at the crown can distort the picture. What keeps a polity running is also the roads, officials, soldiers, resource pools, tax registers, land records and other institutions. Replacing a cruel king with a kinder king does not automatically change the whole machine. The character of the person at the top can matter greatly, but much of the range within which that person can act may already have been laid down by the system before they are in place.
At this point, the problem becomes larger than monarchy itself. How do thousands or even millions of strangers live and act together? They need coordination. Roads, courts, money and irrigation systems cannot run on individual goodwill alone. But the more people depend on these arrangements, the harder it becomes to say, “I do not like this, so I will leave.”
It is not very different today. You can leave a job, but how free are you to do so without savings? You can leave a country, but then passports, visas, money and family enter the picture. So when exit becomes difficult, societies have to invent other forms of leverages. These includes appeals, constitutions, ways to remove representatives, and divisions of power so that everyone does not depend on one institution. And look at the world, it has been far from finished.
Humans became remarkably good at building institutions that live longer than themselves. Roads, hospitals and law can continue after the people who built them are gone. Power learned the same trick. A person dies, but the office, record, law and hierarchy can continue working.
Every step forward can therefore change the bargaining power around us in some new way. The unfinished part of history may be "how do we make power answerable to the people who are affected it?" Perhaps gaining one thing always means giving something else up. But it should not become a bargain in which the domination we humans created can no longer be contested at all.