Rethinking Burma

A Decolonial Reassessment

Burma is still a very understudied subject in global decolonial theory. Countries near Burma, like India and Vietnam, have created many rich discussions about empire, resistance, and postcolonial identity. But Burma has often been studied using existing analytical frameworks. It has not been studied enough through its own voices and intellectual traditions. For many years, the field of Burma studies was shaped by forms of colonial knowledge. This knowledge came from British rule and was later used by the Burmese military. These frameworks included systems of classification, mapping, and historical storytelling. They claimed to be objective. But they were deeply connected to imperial interests. We need to understand why decolonizing Burma studies is both important and overdue. To do this, we must look at the legacies of the colonial archive. We must also look at the persistence of internal hierarchies. Finally, we must look at the political narratives that still define the country.



A major problem is the reliance on British colonial archives as the main source of Burmese history. These documents are informative but they are not neutral. The British were indeed cautious about the political ambitions of the Bamar majority, yet they continued to treat the Bamar as the population most prepared for eventual self-rule. In contrast, the hill peoples were described as communities not yet ready for political autonomy and in need of special guardianship. This viewpoint is captured in the 1945 message from the British monarch, who reassured the hill communities that “separate arrangements will be made for your administration, so that special care and attention may be given to your welfare,” and expressed hope that they would one day “desire of your own free will to take your place in a self-governing Burma.” Such language reveals a paternalistic vision in which the Bamar were positioned as more advanced and the ethnic minorities as populations requiring tutelage. This hierarchy shaped colonial policy, influencing recruitment patterns, administrative divisions, and expectations about political maturity. Decolonizing this field therefore requires turning toward vernacular sources and indigenous perspectives that challenge both the colonial belief in Bamar readiness and the infantilization of minority communities, and that present a more complex, multi-layered account of how the peoples of Burma understood themselves.

While these colonial documents need to be read critically, they remain indispensable. For many regions and periods, the British records are the only surviving written sources, and dismissing them entirely would leave significant historical gaps. The task is not to reject them but to treat them as situated documents shaped by the worldview, interests, and blind spots of their authors. It is also important to recognize that Burmese chronicles and early nationalist writings often reproduced similar hierarchies, portraying indigenous hill peoples as peripheral or uncivilized. This parallel reminds us that all sources carry embedded assumptions and must be placed in dialogue with one another rather than treated as absolute truth.

Having said so, another important part is recognizing patterns of internal colonialism. These patterns emerged after independence. Decolonization in Burma cannot only be about critiquing the British. It must also address how the postcolonial state reproduced colonial structures. This state was dominated by the Bamar ethnic group and the military. Policies of Burmanization promoted the Burmese language, Buddhism, and Bamar cultural norms. This marginalized ethnic minorities. The central government’s approach to the frontier regions copied the extractive habits of the British. It treated areas like Kachin, Shan, and Karen States as places to remove jade, timber, and natural gas. A decolonial approach must therefore question the power dynamics between the center and the periphery. We must see them not just as administrative relations. We must see them as forms of domination that need structural rethinking.

One of the clearest examples of colonial residue is the official classification of "135 national races." This list seems like an ancient truth. But it is actually a direct descendant of colonial census categories. Its modern form was solidified under the dictatorship of Ne Win. It became the foundation of exclusionary policies. The 1982 Citizenship Law is a notable example. It excluded the Rohingya, Gurkha, or other minorities entirely. These rigid identities are very different from precolonial identity. Back then, community membership was shaped by local alliances, geographic movement, and political loyalties. It was not shaped by fixed racial criteria. Decolonizing Burma studies depends on recovering this fluidity. It also requires challenging the rigid categories that support discriminatory systems today.

The field has also been limited by a narrow focus on elite figures. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi is the main example. For years, global scholarship and media framed Burma through a simple story. It was a story of democracy versus dictatorship. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was shown as the only beacon of hope. This focus ignored the broader landscape of grassroots movements. It ignored ethnic armed organizations, student activists, women’s networks, and local civil society groups. These groups have driven real change. The simple narrative collapsed when Daw Aung San Suu Kyi defended the military at the International Court of Justice. This happened during the Rohingya genocide hearings. A meaningful decolonial approach shifts attention to subaltern histories. It focuses on the everyday actors. Their experiences and struggles shape the country much more than elite politics.

Several factors explain why decolonial work in Burma has been slow to develop. Decades of isolation under military rule prevented researchers from accessing the country. It also limited local scholars through censorship and surveillance. True decolonial scholarship requires language skills. Scholars must know Burmese and English. They should also know ethnic languages like Sgaw Karen, Jinghpaw, Shan, Mon, or Rakhine. Very few scholars have the language range needed to access diverse local sources. Fieldwork in the ethnic states is also dangerous. This is especially true in areas where conflict continues and the state keeps tight control. These structural barriers have kept the field narrow, cautious, and often dependent on colonial or state narratives.



The events after the 2021 coup have unexpectedly sped up decolonial thinking. Young Bamar participants in the Spring Revolution have started to question the narratives they were taught in school. This is especially true regarding the Rohingya and other marginalized communities. Many have made public apologies. They have acknowledged how the military used colonial style propaganda to shape their views. The broader resistance movement is now working toward a Federal Democracy Charter. This charter reimagines the country as a partnership among diverse nations. It is not a centralized state modeled on colonial administration. In many ways, these developments are pushing the country toward decolonial transformation. They are doing this faster than academia ever could.

We will update our discussions here. Please stay tune.



Now, let us look to the Elections first.